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Hincher: Civil Procedure

CIVIL PROCEDURE
COURT STRICTLY CONSTRUES RULE 43(K)
TO SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

In Ashfort Corp. v. Palmetto Construction Group, Inc.' the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that Rule 43(k) of the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure applies to settlement agreements. Rule 43(k) requires all
agreements between counsel regarding pending litigation either to be reduced
to a consent order or written stipulation and entered into the record or to be
declared upon the record in open court.2
The controversy in Ashfort arose over settlement of construction litigation
after Hurricane Hugo. The attorneys in the case advised the circuit court that
they had settled the case. As a result, the court dismissed the case, noting on
the judgment form only that "court advised case settled." 3 When a dispute
subsequently arose over the terms of the settlement, respondent, Ashfort
Corporation (Ashfort), moved to reinstate the case to the active trial roster,
and appellants, Palmetto Construction Group, Inc. (Palmetto), moved to
compel settlement. The circuit court, however, refused to compel settlement,
finding that there had not been a "meeting of the minds" with regard to the
settlement.4 In affirming the circuit court's refusal to compel settlement, the
South Carolina Supreme Court held that the alleged settlement agreement was
5
unenforceable because the parties had not complied with Rule 43(k).
The supreme court based its decision primarily on the rationale behind
Rule 43(k). "Like former Circuit Court Rule 14 on which it is based, Rule
43(k) is intended to prevent disputes as to the existence and terms of
agreements regarding pending litigation."6 The court also noted that its

1. __ S.C. _,
458 S.E.2d 533 (1995) (per curiam).
2. S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(k), entitled "Agreements of Counsels," reads as follows: "No
agreement between counsel affecting the proceedings in an action shall be binding unless reduced
to the form of a consent order or written stipulation signed by counsel and entered in the record,
or unless made in open court and noted upon the record."
3. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
4. Id. at
, 458 S.E.2d at 534.
5. Id. at
, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
6. Id. at,
458 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Exparte Pearson, 79 S.C. 302, 60 S.E. 706 (1908)).
Rule 43(k) replaced Circuit Court Practice Rule 14, which was labeled "Consent must be in
writing." Circuit Court Rule 14 used slightly broader language than the present mandate.
No agreement or consentbetween the parties, or their attorneys, in respect to the
proceedings in a cause shall be binding, unless the same shall have been reduced to
the form of an order by consent and entered; or unless the evidence shall be in
writing, subscribed by the party against whom the same shall be alleged, or by his
attorney or counsel; or unless made in open Court and noted by the presiding Judge
or the Stenographer on his minutes by the direction of the presiding Judge.
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holding was consistent with prior case law applying former Circuit Court Rule
141 and is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions construing similar
rules.8
The court, sua sponte, raised the Rule 43(k) issue and, oddly enough, did
not ask the parties to submit briefs on the matter. Simply, the clerk of court
wrote a short letter to appellants' attorney asking if appellants had complied
with Rule 43 (k). Appellants' attorney responded by letter to the clerk, and the
court, much to counsel's surprise, based its opinion on this rather informal
reply. The court rejected appellants' argument that application of Rule 43(k)
to settlement agreements implicitly contravenes solid South Carolina precedent
such as Arnold v. Yarborough,9 which allows parties to establish settlement
agreements by other means, such as through an exchange of letters between
counsel. 10 The court also rejected appellants' contention that Rule 43's title,
"Evidence; Conduct of Trial," limits the rule to evidentiary and trial
matters." Despite Palmetto's argument that the agreement was between its
insurer and Ashfort and not "between counsel" as specified in the rule, the
court held that Rule 43(k) applied because the rule was intended to prevent the
type of dispute being presented.2
The court further rejected appellants' argument that applying Rule 43(k)
to settlement agreements would create uncertainty. 3 Contrary to appellant's
assertion, the court stated that the rule would increase the certainty of
settlement agreements by avoiding unnecessary disputes. 4

S.C. CIR. CT. PRAC. R. 14, repealed by S. C. R. Civ. P. 43(k).
7. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Small v. Small, 286 S.C. 87, 332
S.E.2d 769 (1985) and Bell v. White, 279 S.C. 153, 303 S.E.2d 242 (1983)).
8. Id. at_,458 S.E.2d at 534-35 (citing cases supporting the unenforceabilityof settlement
agreements that do not conform to the formalities of the controlling rules).
9. 281 S.C. 570, 316 S.E.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1984).
10. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
11. Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
12. Id. at
13. Id. at
, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
14. Id. at,
458 S.E.2d at 535. As noted by the supreme court, the very purpose of such
a rule is:
mo prevent fraudulent claims of oral stipulations, and to prevent disputes as to the
existence and terms of agreements and to relieve the court of the necessity of
determining such disputes, which it has been said are often more perplexing than the
case itself. The time of the court should not be taken up in controversial matters of
this character.
Id. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535 (alteration in original) (quoting 83 C.J.S. Stipulations§ 4 (1953)).
For other cases discussing the purpose of the rule requiring stipulations to be in writing, see
Interior CreditBureau, Inc., v. Bussing, 559 P.2d 104, 106 (Alaska 1977) ("to avoid expending
court resources to resolve arguments as to the existence and terms of an oral settlement
agreement"); Roscoe Moss Co. v. Roggero, 54 Cal. Rptr. 911, 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) ("to
insure [sic] that a stipulation ... be properly understood and evidenced"); Rosen v. Grand, 175
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Finally, the court rejected appellants' contention that they had substantially complied with Rule 43(k). Appellants offered two pieces of documentation
to show compliance with Rule 43(k). First, Palmetto presented a letter and
proposed release transmitted from Ashfort. 15 The respondent's letter specifically called for dismissal of the cause of action with prejudice. 6 The court
did not specifically address the letter and release, presumably because neither
was entered into the record. The court stated generally that the appellants'
assertion of substantial compliance was "without merit."17 Second, appellants argued that the circuit court's "Order of Dismissal" satisfied the
mandates of Rule 43(k). The court specifically rejected this contention, finding
that the lower court's perfunctory order, which merely noted "court advised
case settled," did not constitute compliance with Rule 43(k) because the order
did not contain the terms of the alleged settlement agreement.I"
The holding in Ashfort supports the idea that although settlement is
favored, 19 the court will not take it upon itself to fashion a settlement
agreement by deciding factual issues relating to an alleged oral settlement
agreement.2 0 There is no judicial economy or efficiency gained if the court
has to virtually try the case to give effect to an alleged settlement agreement. 2'
N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) ("to relieve the courts from the constant determina-

tion of controverted issues of fact with reference to such proceedings."); Kaui v. County of

Kauai, 386 P.2d 880, 884 (Haw. 1963) (per curiam) ("for the protection of the court against the
burden of determining controverted questions of fact with respect to oral agreements between
counsel"); Sone v. Braunig, 469 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. App. 1971) ("to remove from the
'fallibility of human recollection' agreements made by 'counsel in the course of judicial
proceeding[s] which affect the interests of their clients'" (quoting McClain v. Hickey, 418
S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1967))).
15. See Letter from Julius H. Hines of Buist, Moore, Smythe, & McGee, P.A., Counsel for
Appellants, to the Honorable Clyde N. Davis, Jr., Clerk of the South Carolina Supreme Court
(April 14, 1995) (on file with the South Carolina Supreme Court).
16. Id. at2.
17. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
18. Id. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 535 (citing Exparte Pearson, 79 S.C. 302, 309, 60 S.E. 706,
708 (1908)) and Lyons Enters., Inc. v. Custer, 814 P.2d 780, 782 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991)).
19. E.g., Darden v. Witham, 258 S.C. 380, 388, 188 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1972) ("The courts
favor settlements and agreements amongst litigants, and regard as commendable efforts by the
parties to settle their differences without the courts' intervention or assistance.").
20. See Rock Smith Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 309 S.C. 91, 93, 419 S.E.2d 841, 842 (Ct.
App. 1992) ("But even as the court may enforce settlement, it has the inherent power to refuse
to enforce settlements.").
21. See Resnick v. Valente, 637 P.2d 1205, 1206 (Nev. 1981) (per curiam) (providing that
the rule gives the court an "efficient method for determining genuine settlements and enforcing
them" and thus, "does not thwart the policy in favor of settling disputes" but rather, "enhances
the reliability of actual settlements" and avoids "trial by affidavit").
The ideals of judicial efficiency and economy are inherent in the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 1 enunciates how the rules are to be interpreted and applied: "They shall
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As the supreme court stated in Ashfort, applying Rule 43(k) to settlement
agreements is likely to increase certainty surrounding such agreements.Y The
rule achieves greater certainty in several ways. First, Rule 43(k) provides
counsel and parties with a bright line test for when the court will enforce
settlement agreements.? Second, the rule helps avert possible statute of
frauds problems by requiring that all agreements not executed or admitted be
in writing.24 Third, the rule avoids unnecessary disputes over whether a
condition precedent to the agreement was to reduce the fmal agreement to
writing.' Fourth, the rule allows parties to see the agreement laid out in
writing and to fully consider its terms before assenting. Thus the process
ensures that the parties have reached a "meeting of the minds" and are
committed to a final, deliberate agreement.2 6
After Ashfort, parties and counsel must clearly comply with the requirements of Rule 43(k) in order to effect a binding, enforceable settlement
agreement.' Less clear, however, is whether counsel must comply with the

be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." S.C.
R. Civ. P. 1.
22. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
23. Courts favor encouraging parties to reach a settlement and do not want to make parties
afraid to enter into negotiations. Chandler v. Geraty, 10 S.C. 304 (1878). In Chandlerthe court
stated:
These propositions [of settlement amounts] were made simply with a view to avoid
litigation, and it is against the policy of the law to discourage parties from attempts
to settle their differences by holding them up to any propositions they may make in
the course of negotiations for that purpose after such negotiations have failed.
Id. at 308. Without the rule, the court must expend valuable time and energy to determine
whether parties embroiled in litigation previously reached an enforceable settlement agreement.
See Wood v. Virginia Hauling Co., 528 F.2d 423, 425-26 (4th Cir. 1975) ("A settlement
agreement by definition should end litigation. Court clerks and ... judges cannot monitor the
disintegration of a cause of action by bits and pieces. . . . There is no such thing as half
settlement or even 95 percent settlement."); Ozyagcilar v. Davis, 701 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir.
1983) (providing that the court has no power to impose, as a "final arbiter," a settlement
agreement in which there was no meeting of the minds).
24. See, e.g., Herndon v. Herndon, 183 S.E.2d 386, 389 (Ga. 1971).
25. See Columbia Management Corp. v. Resort Properties, Inc., of Beaufort, 279 S.C. 370,
372-73, 307 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1983) "[W]hen the parties contemplate execution of a written
agreement as a condition precedent to being bound, no valid contract arises until the agreement
is executed." (citing Bugg v. Bugg, 272 S.C. 122, 249 S.E.2d 505 (1978); Holliday v. Pegram,
89 S.C. 73, 71 S.E. 367 (1911))); overruledon othergroundsby Crandall Corp. v. NavistarInt'l
Transp. Corp., 302 S.C. 265, 395 S.E.2d "'79 (1990); Reed v. Boykin, 282 S.C. 614, 320
S.E.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1984).
26. The holding inAshfort is consistent with fundamental settlement principles: "'[S]incea
compromise and settlement is contractual in nature, a definite meeting of the minds of the parties
is essential to a valid compromise. . . .'" O'Connor v. GCC Beverages, Inc., 391 S.E.2d 379,
381 (W. Va. 1990) (quoting 15A C.J.S. Compromise & Settlement § 7(1) (1967)).
27. However, Rule 43(k), like former Circuit Court Practice Rule 14, does not apply if the
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literal language of Rule 43(k) or with the less rigorous requirements set out in
former Circuit Court Practice Rule 14 and prior case law interpreting Rule 14.
A party can comply with Rule 43(k) in three ways. The rule requires that
a settlement agreement be reduced to (1) a written stipulation or to (2) a
consent order, either of which must be signed and entered into the court
record; alternately, (3) the settlement agreement may be announced in open
court and noted upon the record.'
Former Rule 14, however, allowed three slightly easier ways to satisfy the
rule. One could comply with the former rule through (1) a consent order
entered into the record, as above, or (2) through a writing, signed by the party
to be charged, or (3) through announcement in open court, noted by or at the
direction of the judge.29
Thus, under former Rule 14, a party can satisfy the writing requirement,
for example, by an exchange of letters between the parties or counsel, yet such
an exchange would be insufficient under a literal interpretation of Rule 43(k)'s
"stipulation" requirement. If strict compliance with Rule 43(k) is required,
then Ashfort dramatically changes state practice concerning the form of
settlement agreements because a party could not use letters between counsel
to prove a valid, written settlement agreement.
In Ashfort the appellants raised this issue by arguing that application of
Rule 43(k) to settlement agreements would overrule established South Carolina
precedent on the form of settlement agreements, such as the letters exchanged
in Arnold v. Yarborough.30 The Ashfort court side-stepped this fundamental
question, responding that the issue in Arnold was the power of the attorney to
on behalf of the client, not the form of the
enter into the settlement agreement
31
settlement agreement itself.
The literal language of Rule 43(k) is that an agreement should be
"reduced" to a written stipulation, intimating reduction of the agreement to
one final document.32 The supreme court, however, did not directly address
this issue. Thus, it appears a series of letters between counsel could constitute
a written stipulation if signed by counsel and entered into the record as
required.

parties admit or execute the agreement. Ashfort, _ S.C. at __ n.1, 458 S.E.2d at 534 n.1
("[I]t is generally held [that] such rules have no application when the agreement is admitted, or
where it has been carried into effect." (citing Exparte Pearson, 79 S.C. 302, 309, 60 S.E. 706,

708 (1908))).
28. S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(k).
29. See S.C. CIR. CT. PRAC. R. 14, repealedby S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(k).

30. 281 S.C. 570, 316 S.E.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1984).
31. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
32. If this interpretation proves true, South Carolina now requires more formality than many
other majority-rule states. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text, discussing Texas's and
Louisiana's interpretation of the "writing" requirement.
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In addition, the supreme court's broad construction of Rule 43(k) in
Ashfort may indicate a willingness to maintain consistency with the looser
writing requirement of former Rule 14. In Ashfort the supreme court rejected
two limiting arguments raised by the appellants. First, the appellants argued
that Rule 43 did not apply to settlement agreements because the rule's title
"Evidence; Conduct of Trial" limited application of the rule to evidentiary and
trial matters. 33 Consistent with its prior approach to construing the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure,14 the supreme court held that because the
text of Rule 43(k) is unambiguous, Rule 43(k) could not be limited by its
title.

35

Similarly, the Ashfort court broadly interpreted Rule 43(k) in rejecting
appellants' second argument that the rule was not applicable because it
regulates agreements between counsel. 36 The appellants contended that the
agreement in question was not between counsel but merely confirmed by
counsel as a formality. 37 The supreme court responded by stating that such
a narrow reading of the rule would frustrate the rule's purpose of preventing
disputes over the existence and terms of "all agreements regarding pending
litigation. "3 Thus, the supreme court apparently interpreted the scope of
Rule 43(k) as consistent with the language of former Rule 14, which applies
to all agreements and consents "between the parties, or their attorneys. "3
Former Circuit Court Practice Rule 14 is an old and venerable rule, and
courts have historically enforced strict compliance with it. "Under this rule
[14] the court will not hold a party or his counsel bound to do or abstain from
doing anything in pursuance of an agreement not shown to have been made in
accordance with the rule."4 The court has stated that the rule is for the
protection of the court and of the parties. Thus, parties must adhere faithfully
to its requirements, or the courts will simply not enforce the agreement.4 "

33. Ashfort, _ S.C. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
34. Garner v. Houck, 312 S.C. 481, 435 S.E.2d 847 (1993).
35. Ashfort, _ S.C. at _, 458 S.E.2d at 535; see Garner,312 S.C. at 486, 435 S.E.2d
at 849 ("For interpretative purposes, the title of a statute and heading of a section are of use only
when they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase and as tools available for resolution of
doubt, but they cannot undo or limit what the text makes plain." (emphasis added)).
36. S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(k).
37. Ashfort, _ S.C. at __, 458 S.E.2d at 535.
38. Id. at _,
458 S.E.2d at 535 (emphasis added).
C. Cir. Ct. Prac. R. 14, repealedby S.C. R. Civ. P. 43(k).
40. Exparte Pearson, 79 S.C. 302, 309, 60 S.E. 706, 708 (1908).
41. See Bell v. White, 279 S.C. 153, 154-55, 303 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1983) (refusing to
reinstate action for specific performance of an option agreement based on alleged oral agreement
between counsel); Brewton v. Inter-Carolinas Motor Bus Co., 167 S.C. 151, 151-52, 166 S.E.
85, 85 (1932) (per curiam) ("'IThe proper and safer practice, for the protection of all parties,
and for the court as well, is to have such consent, if obtained, evidenced by writing.'" (quoting
Wade v. Gore, 154 S.C. 262, 264, 151 S.E. 470, 471 (1930))); see also Moore v. Jim Moore
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Soon after its decision in Ashfort, the supreme court applied its holding
to find another alleged settlement agreement unenforceable. In Widewater
Square Associates v. Opening Break of America, Inc.4' the supreme court
utilized Rule 43(k) to decide a dispute over the meaning and effect of a form
order. The issue in Widewater was whether an administrative judge effectively
dismissed an allegedly settled cause of action by checking the block marked
"Settled" on Form 4, South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, Form Order.
The judge wrote "Noted at Roster Sounding" under the settlement block but
did not check the block entitled "Action Dismissed."' The petitioners argued
that Form 4 reflected a final, enforceable order of settlement. The respondents in Widewater denied entering into a settlement and characterized the
was
petitioner's contention as "simply an attempt to gain relief where none
" 44
not.
did
it
when
occurred
determination
judicial
a
that
assert
to
given,
The supreme court held that whether Form 4 had been intended to be used
as an administrative form or to order final judgment in the action was
ultimately irrelevant. The court refused to enforce the alleged "settlement"
order under the circumstances because the alleged settlement agreement,
although arguably "announced in open court," did not set forth the terms of
the agreement as required by Rule 43(k) and as explained in Ashfort."
The holding in Ashfort and its almost immediate application in Widewater
suggest that the supreme court will require strict compliance with Rule 43(k),
consistent with the spirit of the case law applying former Circuit Court
Practice Rule 14. The supreme court's decision is highly significant because
Rule 43(k) applies to all settlement agreements, unless admitted or executed.
Thus, Rule 43(k) is now an additional, crucial hoop through which counsel
must jump to ensure a binding settlement agreement. Practitioners must do

Cadillac, Inc., 287 S.C. 240, 241, 335 S.E.2d 798, 798 (1985) (per curiam) (finding "[n]o
excusable neglect is shown when an alleged extension is not obtained in writing as required by
Circuit Court Rule 14 and no excuse is offered for failure to comply with the rule"); Metts v.
Carmack, 276 S.C. 280, 278 S.E.2d 333 (1981) (per curiam) (finding alleged extension was not
binding absent compliance with Rule 14); Gillespie v. Rowe, 275 S.C. 98, 99-100, 267 S.E.2d
535, 536 (1980) (per curiam) (finding no excusable neglect).
42. __ S.C. _, 460 S.E.2d 396 (1995) (per curiam).
43. Id. at _, 460 S.E.2d at 396.
44. Brief of Respondent at 15, Widewater (No. 91-CP-40-1171) ("In the instant case, there
was no settlement agreement. There has been no compliance with a settlement agreement because
there was no settlement.").
45. Widewater, _ S.C. at __, 460 S.E.2d at 397. Compare Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v.
Counts, 98 S.C. 136, 146, 82 S.E. 391, 393 (1914) (presuming that under Rule 14 an agreement
marked "heard" and referred to a referee was valid), with Brown v. Rogers, 71 S.C. 512, 516,
51 S.E. 257, 258 (1905) ("The marking of the case 'heard' by the circuit judge on the calendar
in open court was not an agreement in writing . . . nor was it a memorandum of such an
agreement noted by the presiding judge, with the consent in open court of the plaintiff's attorney,
under rule 14 of the circuit court.").
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more than enter into the valid settlement agreement; they must reduce the
agreement to one of the forms allowed by Rule 43(k) and enter the agreement

into the record. The practicing bar may have valid concerns 46 that this new

rule will indeed transform settlement negotiations into the colloquial "three
ring circus" depending upon how strictly the rule is construed.
As the supreme court noted, Ashfort is consistent with the majority rule.
That is, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions construing similar court
rules or statutes have held that the written stipulation rule applies to settlement
agreements. Because the language of court rules or statutes differs from state
to state, the facets of rule or statutory application correspondingly differ, but
the primary rationale behind the decisions is the same. For example, in
Canyon Contracting Co. v. Tohono O'Odham Housing Authority,47 the
Arizona Court of Appeals held that Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 80(d),
requiring disputed, out- of-court agreements to be in writing, applies to
settlement agreements because the language of the rule does not limit the type
of agreements to which it applies and because sound policy reasons support
applying the rule to settlement agreements. 48 The Arizona court also strictly
requirements in light of the policy of avoiding difficult
construed the rule's
49
proof.
of
issues
The courts in both Texas and Louisiana have also applied their written
stipulation rules 0 to settlement agreements, as is reflected in ample case law
from both jurisdictions. As in South Carolina, Texas and Louisiana courts
will not compel enforcement of agreements that do not comply with the
rule.5 1 The Texas and Louisiana courts strictly construe their rules and seem

46. See Hines letter, supra note 15, at 1-2 ("Even where attorneys have confirmed the terms
of a settlement in writing, the settlement would be voidable at the will of either party at any time
prior to entry or filing of an order or written stipulation.. . . It remains the general understanding of the bar that settlement agreements are binding when made, not when entered upon the
record.").
S.C. at _, 458
47. 837 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), cited with approvalin Ashfort
S.E.2d at 534-35.
48. Canyon Contracting, 837 P.2d at 752.
49. Id. at 754 (citing Hackin v. Rupp, 452 P.2d 519, 520-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)); see
Lyons Enters., Inc. v. Custer, 814 P.2d 780, 782 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]n order to determine
not only that the parties reached an agreement but the terms of the agreement, the trial court
would have to resolve the factual dispute between the parties .... This is precisely what [the
rule] was designed to avoid.").
50. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 3071 (West 1994) reads, in pertinent part: "[A settlement]
must be either reduced into writing or recited in open court and capable of being transcribed from
the record of the proceeding." Likewise, TEx. R. Civ. P. 11 states that "no agreement between
attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing, signed and
filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open court and entered of
record."
51. E.g., Felder v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 405 So. 2d 521, 523 (La. 1981) (citing Bourgeois
v. Franklin, 389 So. 2d 358 (La. 1980); Jasmin v. Gafney, Inc., 357 So. 2d 539 (La. 1978));
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to focus on the rules' purpose to avoid disputes about the existence and terms
of settlement agreements.52 The Texas and Louisiana courts have also
considered what constitutes compliance with the "writing" 3 and "open
court"54 requirements of their respective rules. The consensus seems to be
that a valid agreement needs to evidence the unequivocal assent of the parties
and the definite terms of the agreement. 5
As noted in Ashfort 6 Georgia and New York are noteworthy exceptions
to the majority.57 These two minority jurisdictions reason that the local rules
Kennedy v. Hyde, 682 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Tex. 1984); Estate of Pewthers v. Holland Page Indus.,
Inc., 443 S.W.2d 392, 397 (Tex. App. 1969).
52. See McClain v. Hickey, 418 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tex. App. 1967) ("The rule requires a
written and signed memorial of the agreement. This necessarily means that the assent to and
details of the agreement be shown by the memorial; otherwise the assent to and content of the
agreement might be preserved only in the memory of the persons making it.").
53. See, e.g., Cavallini v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 44 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 1995)
(parties' correspondence satisfied writing agreement and thus created enforceable settlement
despite later objections to terms); Parich v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 906, 914
(5th Cir. 1990) ("[A] writing will not be considered a compromise if the court must receive parol
evidence to reach that conclusion." (citing Senegal v. Delahoussaye, 311 So. 2d 58, 61 (La. Ct.
App. 1975))); Felder, 405 So. 2d at 524 ("[W]here two instruments, when read together, outline
the obligations each party has to the other and evidence each party's acquiescence in the
agreement, a written compromise agreement, as contemplated by La. C.C. art. 3071, has been
perfected"); Coleman v. Academy of the Sacred Heart, 650 So. 2d 265,267 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
("A letter by one of the parties setting forth their understanding of the agreement is not an
agreement of the parties reduced to writing.").
54. See, e.g., Jones v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 769 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. App. 1989)
(holding that an entry of "8-27-87 Dismissed" on the trial court's docket sheet did not reflect an
agreement made "in open court" or memorialize the terms of the agreement on the record).
Anderegg v. High Standard, Inc., 825 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1987), is an amusing case addressing the open court requirement. In Anderegg plaintiffs counsel claimed to have "announced" an
oral settlement in open court by shouting out its terms onto the record, over the defendant's
protests and disavowals. Incredibly, the district court held that these antics satisfied Texas' Rule
11. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating:
It is clear that the Rule contemplates that something more is required for the
enforcement of such an agreement than that it be a valid contract. . . . An 'agreement' such as the one in this case, one in which the terms are shouted at the bench
by counsel for one side and immediately repudiated by the other, might well consist
of something less than a contract valid under general law-in such a case there may
We conclude that the
have been no antecedent agreement between counsel at all ....
"made-in-open-court" exception to Rule lI's requirement of a signed writing for
enforcement of agreements between counsel requires the substantial equivalent of a
writing and signatures: a statement into the record of the terms of the agreement in
the presence of the court, plus the agreement of the parties (or their counsel) to be
bound by it affirmatively stated on the record. Clearly, what was done in this case
does not suffice.
Anderegg, 825 F.2d at 80-81 (footnotes omitted).
55. See Felder, 405 So. 2d at 524.
56. __ S.C. at __ n.2, 458 S.E.2d at 534-35 n.2.
57. See, e.g., Boswell v. Gillen, 62 S.E. 187 (Ga. 1908); Langlois v. Langlois, 169
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do not apply to compromise and settlement agreements because settlements
completely dispose of the litigation and thus are not true procedural agreethe South Carolina Supreme
ments affecting pending litigation. 8 In Ashfort
59
persuasive.
reasoning
this
find
not
did
Court
In New York and Georgia the courts have established various additional
criterion to preclude doubtful oral settlement agreements. In fact, the courts
often apply the minority rule in a way that makes it virtually indistinguishable
from the majority rule. Most oral settlement agreements are upheld in Georgia
and New York for reasons compatible with the majority rule exemption of
For example, the minority
admitted or executed settlement agreements.'
courts will enforce only a "'definite, certain, and unambiguous [oral]
settlement agreement, which is not denied.' 6' As under the majority rule,
"'where the very existence of the agreement is disputed, it may only be
established by a writing."'62 Similarly, "the failure to agree to even one
N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957).
58. Boswell, 62 S.E. at 187 ("The rule of court that no consent between attorneys or parties,
if denied, will be enforced, if not in writing, has no application to an oral agreement and
compromise of a pending suit."); Langlois, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 175 ("That rule is applicable only
to agreements relating to matters in the action and it does not apply to an agreement completely
disposing of the action and of the claim upon which it was based.").
59. See Ashfort, __ S.C. __ n.2, 458 S.E.2d at 534-35 n.2. Not all judges in Georgia
support the minority rule. In a vigorous dissent in Herndon v. Herndon, 183 S.E.2d 386, 389
(Ga. 1971) (Felton, J., dissenting), a divorce settlement case, Justice Felton stated that, in
addition to ignoring a statute of frauds violation, "[tihe most objectionable phase of the court's
rulings [in Herndon] is that they make another unwarranted exception to the law which prevents
the substitution of an oral agreement for a definite, written contract by which the parties agreed
to be bound exclusively."
60. See Ashfort, __ S.C. at __ n.1, 458 S.E.2d at 534 n.1.
61. Southern Med. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 454 S.E.2d 180, 182 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Smith v. Haverty Furniture Co., 326 S.E.2d 812, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)); see,
e.g., In re Dolgin Eldert Corp., 286 N.E.2d 228 (N.Y. 1972) (holding that the settlement
agreement in question must be sufficiently definite and complete in its material terms and respects
and be supported by competent evidence).
62. Reichard v. Reichard, 423 S.E.2d 241,243 (Ga. 1992) (quoting LeCroy v. Massey, 366
S.E.2d 215, 216 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)); see, e.g., Langlois, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 175. LeCroy
illustrates the usefulness and efficiency of the majority's bright line test. The alleged settlement
in LeCroy was "hotly contested"-three of the six attorneys involved swore they reached a
settlement, and three swore that there was no settlement agreement. LeCroy, 366 S.E.2d at 216.
Langlois is also illustrative. In Langlois after plaintiff had advised the defendants and the judge
that the case was settled, after the case was stricken from trial calendar, and after plaintiff had
admitted existence and terms of settlement, the court held that plaintiff did not have the arbitrary
right to repudiate an oral settlement not yet reduced to writing. Langlois, 169 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
In Georgia, when a settlement agreement is disputed, and a written agreement, therefore,
is required, the writing "'ideally consists of a formal written agreement signed by the parties.
However, letters or documents prepared by attorneys which memorialize the terms of the
agreement reached will suffice.'" Herring v. Dunning, 446 S.E.2d 199, 202 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Stevens v. McCarty, 401 S.E.2d 605, 607 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)).
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essential term means there is 'no agreement to be enforced.'" '63
In New York, the courts frequently uphold oral settlement agreements on
the basis of prejudice. "Even if a stipulation be verbal, the court will hold it
to be effectual, so as not to prejudice, deceive, or defraud the opposite party,
if he has relied and acted upon the agreement in good faith."' New York's
more liberal approach to oral settlement agreements likely stems from its view
that the purpose of the stipulation requirement is administrative convenience. 6s
The minority rule appears to enforce basically the same oral settlement
agreements that the majority rule would enforce.' Doctrinally, however, the
rules are fundamentally different. As noted by the Nebraska Supreme Court
67 strict adherence to the minority rule
in Omaha NationalBank v. Mullenax,
6
could produce an anomalous result:

63. Reichard, 423 S.E.2d at 243 (quoting Bridges v. Bridges, 349 S.E.2d 172, 174 (Ga.
1986)); see, e.g., Monaghanv. SZS 33 Assoc., L.P., 875 F. Supp. 1037, 1042 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("In view of the fact that an agreement was reached, the absence of significant disagreement as
to its terms and contingencies, and the . . . good-faith reliance on the settlement, the oral
stipulation will be enforced."), aft'd, 73 F.3d 1276 (1996).
64. Lee v. Rudd, 198 N.Y.S. 628, 630 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1923).
In essence, the New York view is estoppel; this parallels the majority view that the
stipulation rule is inapplicable if the stipulation is executed. See, e.g., Monaghan, 875 F. Supp.
at 1042 ("A settlement agreed to before a court but not recorded can still be enforced when there
is little dispute as to its terms and no dispute as to the parties having reached an agreement.");
Gass v. Arons, 227 N.Y.S. 282, 284 (N.Y. City Ct. 1928) (holding a settlement had been
announced in open court despite the fact that terms of the agreement were discussed off record,
in the judges chambers; alternatively, the court found that plaintiff had shown sufficient prejudice
to uphold the verbal agreement because plaintiff had lost an opportunity to finish trial in term of
court in which it was begun by relying on settlement). See generally 15A C.J.S. Compromise &
Settlement § 7(2) (1967) ("Sufficiency of Acceptance in General").
65. As stated in Monaghan:
It has been recognized... that the rule requiring stipulations of settlement to be
in writing is one of convenience designed to relieve courts from having to resolve
disputes as to the terms of such stipulations. Thus where there is no dispute as to
terms it is eminently reasonable to refuse to permit use of the rule against a party who
has been misled or deceived by the oral stipulation ... or who has relied upon it.
Monaghan, 875 F. Supp. at 1043 (quoting Hansen v. Prudential Lines, Inc., 461 N.Y.S.2d 670,
675 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)).
66. See Rosen v. Grand, 175 N.Y.S.2d 441, 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958) ("Since respondents
suffered no prejudice from the repudiation of the alleged settlement, it would not be in the best
interests of justice to explore unnecessary and embarrassing issues of fact arising between counsel
and the court."); Goldbard v. Empire State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 171 N.Y.S.2d 194, 201-02 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1958) (demonstrating the court's refusal to enforce an alleged oral settlement
agreement because the "inchoate and staccato negotiations that ensued in this case, culminating
in a relayed telephone call," did not warrant the finding of "the finality, the deliberateness, or
the occasional formalization" associated with a binding settlement agreement.).
67. 320 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1982).
68. Interestingly, the Nebraska Supreme Court overruled itself to join league with the
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It would be strange indeed if an [oral settlement] agreement which
would be unenforceable under the statute of frauds and is also unenforceable under a court rule applicable to all parties to a suit were to become
enforceable simply because the matter involved in the settlement agreement
was pending as a lawsuit in court. Even though the law favors and
encourages settlements, the fact that a lawsuit has been filed ought not to
validate an otherwise unenforceable contract. 69
The bright line test of the majority rule avoids this anomalous result and
is relatively easy to administer. If the parties have complied with the writing
requirement, the agreement is enforceable. On the policy side, the court can
more comfortably assume that the settlement agreement embodies a final,
deliberate, formal agreement to which all parties have assented after objective
assessment of and reflection on the proposed terms.
In Ashfort, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted this bright line test
for enforcement of settlement agreements, holding that Rule 43(k) of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure applies to settlement agreements. Ashfort
dictates that practitioners do more than enter into a traditionally enforceable
settlement agreement. Practitioners must also comply with Rule 43(k). Before
the court will enforce an alleged settlement agreement, the parties either must
(1) reduce the settlement agreement and its terms to a consent order or written
stipulation and enter it into the record or (2) announce the agreement and its
terms in open court and enter them into the record. A question unanswered
in Ashfort is whether traditional settlement writings, such as an exchange of
letters between counsel, constitute a written stipulation of a settlement if
entered into the record. Until that question is definitively resolved, the safest
course for practitioners is to strictly and literally comply with the dictates of
Rule 43(k).
Lisa J. Hincher
majority. In Simmons v. Murray, 204 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1973), the Nebraska Supreme Court
originally embraced the minority rule. In addition to relying on the reasoning enunciated in the
New York and Georgia decisions, Simmons held that the Nebraska Supreme Court was not
required to take judicial notice of lower courts' rules of practice. Id. at 801.
In a strong dissent, Justice Newton noted that "the spectacle of counsel contradicting each
other as to the existence of an agreement illustrated the reason why the rule was adopted," id.
at 804, namely, the protection of the court, and of attorneys as officers of the court, in the
efficient, dignified administration ofjustice. Id. at 804 (citing Manowitz v. Gaenslen, 142 S.W.
963 (Tex. App. 1912)). Justice Newton further stated: "The lav favors settlements but not
disputes in regardto them between attorneys. Misunderstandingsfrequently occur, even between
very careful practitioners. If we are to hear and heed such disputes, settlements will be
discouraged. Attorneys will be afraid to discuss settlements for fear of being misunderstood or
wrongfully quoted." Id. (Newton, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
69. Mullenax, 320 N.W.2d at 758. The court held that alleged oral compromises not made
in open court are unenforceable when in violation of the court rule requiring written stipulations
or agreements or when in contravention of the statute of frauds. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol48/iss1/4

12

